Papers
For citation numbers and a full list of my works, see my Google Scholar page.
Samuel C. Fletcher, Joshua Knobe, Gregory Wheeler, Brian Allan Woodcock
Abstract
Traditionally, logic has been the dominant formal method within philosophy. Are logical methods still dominant today, or have the types of formal methods used in philosophy changed in recent times? To address this question, we coded a sample of philosophy papers from the late 2000s and from the late 2010s for the formal methods they used. The results indicate that (a) the proportion of papers using logical methods remained more or less constant over that time period but (b) the proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was approximately three times higher in the late 2010s than it was in the late 2000s. Further analyses explored this change by looking more closely at specific methods, specific levels of technical engagement, and specific subdisciplines within philosophy. These analyses indicate that the increasing proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was pervasive, not confined to particular probabilistic methods, levels of sophistication, or subdisciplines.
Daily Nous Discussion
A succinct summary and discussion of the results were posted in the Daily Nous under the title "Evidence for a Probabilistic Turn in Philosophy." For the busy person, read this.
Brian A. Woodcock
Abstract
‘‘The Scientific Method’’ as it has been portrayed in popular and introductory contexts has been declared a myth. The variation that one finds in introductory presentations of ‘‘The Scientific Method’’ is explained by the fact that there is no canonical account among historians and philosophers of science. What, in particular, is wrong with ‘‘The Scientific Method’’? This essay provides a fairly comprehensive survey of shortcomings of ‘‘The Scientific Method’’. Included are corrections to several misconceptions that often accompany such presentations. Rather than treating ‘‘The Scientific Method’’ as a useful approximation or an ideal, the myth should be discarded. Lessons can be learned for introductory pedagogical contexts from considering the shortcomings of the myth.
Brian A. Woodcock
Abstract
I show how an almost exclusive focus on the simplest case—the case of a single particle—along with the commonplace conception of the single-particle wave function as a scalar field on spacetime contributed to the perception, first brought to light by I. Bloch, that there existed a contradiction between quantum theory with instantaneous state collapses and special relativity. The incompatibility is merely apparent since treating wave-function values as hypersurface dependent avoids the contradiction. After clarifying confusions which fueled the perception of a paradox, I elaborate on an analysis of the wave function due to Wayne Myrvold to show that nothing special, or ad hoc, is required in treating wave-function values, even in the single-particle case, as hypersurface–dependent; rather, the hypersurface dependence of these values is the natural development of nonlocal entanglement in the context of the relativity of simultaneity. Properly understood, what Bloch’s paradox reveals is that the combination of nonlocal entanglement together with a hypersurface-dependent process of state collapse conflicts with the thesis of spatiotemporal separability and, in particular, with the idea that chances are local matters of fact.
